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Sales and use taxes, which are levied by forty-five states, have long been an important source of revenue for
state and local governments. The rigid structure of these long-standing taxes, however, has been strained by
the rapid evolution of the online economy. As a result, the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”) devised a
plan, the Streamlined State Sales Tax Project (“STP”), to recapture some of the revenue that state and local
governments might otherwise lose as consumer purchases migrate from local retailers to online sellers. This
plan, approved reciprocally by the states, but not by Congress, was designed by state legislators to comply with
legal guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court. This Comment argues, however, that if a foreign merchant
challenges these laws, the STP would be declared unconstitutional based on a modern understanding of the
Commerce Clause and a structural, federalist reasoning. Part I discusses the evolution of sales and use taxes
and their importance to state and local governments. Part II discusses the rising tension between the structure
of sales and use taxes and the structure of the American economy. Part II also documents the STP—the states’
recent response to this tension—and explains the STP’s legal underpinnings. Part III analyzes the potential
legal challenges the STP would face from a foreign merchant and concludes that while it is likely
constitutional on due process grounds, the STP is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause based on
stare decisis and federalist reasoning.
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INTRODUCTION
The next time you buy clothing, food, or a video, notice the
difference between the sticker price and the amount you end up
paying. In most areas, this difference, the sales tax, goes to the state,
1
although some of the revenue may go to a local government. The
courts ruled long ago that state and local governments have the
power to levy these taxes in a typical retail situation, where a
customer buys a good from a store, because the transaction occurred
2
within state or local boundaries.
Now consider how many times you have purchased an item online
in the past year. What if the merchant from whom you purchased the
good did not own any property in your state? Did you still pay sales
tax on that item? Does a state have authority over an online
merchant who owns no property in the state, has no employees in the
state, and has no understanding of the laws of the state? Can the
state force the merchant to collect the taxes from you? As the
3
number of online transactions continues to grow, this hypothetical
situation underscores a growing tension between state and federal
government: Congress often passes legislation regulating interstate
transactions, but as more of our transactions are interstate in nature,
the states have begun to assert their own authority in order to
preserve income.
4
Sales and use taxes, which are levied by forty-five states, have long
been an important source of revenue for state and local governments.
The rigid structure of these long-standing taxes, however, has been

1. See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
§§ 12.01-12.02 (3d ed. 2005) (defining the sales tax and describing the growth of
local and state sales taxes).
2. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (surveying the Supreme Court’s
treatment of sales and use taxes).
3. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing
importance of online transactions in America).
4. See Federation of Tax Administrators, State Sales Tax Rates,
http://www.taxadmin.org/FTA/rate/sales.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (listing
the general, prepared food, prescription drug, and non-prescription drug sales tax
rates for all states and the District of Columbia as of Jan. 1, 2006).
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strained by the rapid evolution of the online economy. As a result,
the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”) devised a plan, the
6
Streamlined State Sales Tax Project (“STP”), to recapture some of
the revenue that state and local governments might otherwise lose as
consumer purchases migrate from local retailers to online sellers.
This plan, approved reciprocally by the states, but not by Congress,
was designed by state legislators to comply with legal guidelines
7
articulated by the Supreme Court.
8
This Comment argues, however, that if a foreign merchant
challenges these laws, the STP would be declared unconstitutional
based on a modern understanding of the Commerce Clause and a
structural, federalist reasoning. Part I discusses the evolution of sales
and use taxes and their importance to state and local governments.
Part II discusses the rising tension between the structure of sales and
use taxes and the structure of the American economy. Part II also
documents the STP—the states’ recent response to this tension—and
explains the STP’s legal underpinnings. Part III analyzes the
potential legal challenges the STP would face from a foreign
merchant and concludes that while it is likely constitutional on due
process grounds, the STP is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause based on stare decisis and federalist reasoning.
I. BACKGROUND: SALES AND USE TAXES EXPLAINED
A sales tax is a levy by a government entity on commercial
9
transactions of tangible personal property; it is a consumption tax.
Only state and local governments have imposed sales taxes; there is

5. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (identifying the challenges states
face in the changing market).
6. This Comment will refer to the project as the Streamlined Tax Project, or
STP, in an effort to avoid the erroneous implication of the official name that the
project covers only sales taxes, and not use taxes. See infra Part I (explaining
differences between sales and use taxes).
7. See infra Part II.B (explaining participating states’ goals in creating the STP,
including compliance with Supreme Court arguments to simplify taxation).
8. Within this Comment, the term “foreign merchant” refers to a domestic
retailer who sells goods on the Internet, where the goods are delivered through a
common carrier to a given state, while the merchant has no assets or employees
within that state. References to foreign merchants in a historical context are to
merchants who transacted business through catalog sales. For the sake of emphasis,
this Comment may also refer to a foreign merchant as an Internet retailer to
highlight the technology used in the transactions at issue today. For simplicity, this
Comment does not consider the implications of truly foreign merchants—i.e., those
merchants located, and solely operating, outside of the boundaries of the United
States.
9. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 4.12(2)(c).
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10

no national sales tax in the United States. Generally, state and local
governments have exempted certain goods, and usually all types of
11
services, from taxation for two reasons. First, state governments
were concerned that a broader sales tax might be too regressive—the
lowest income earners bearing the highest percent of the tax relative
12
to earnings. Second, some argue that taxing only tangible goods
eases the state’s administrative burden of deciding which transactions
13
to tax.
The states’ approach to consumption taxation has been
markedly different from that of much of the Western world, which
14
has gradually moved to favor the value-added tax (“VAT”).
10. See Gerald E. Auten & Eric J. Toder, Federal Consumption Tax Proposals and the
States, in THE SALES TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY 52, 53 (Matthew M. Murray & William F.
Fox eds., 1997) (explaining that the federal tax structure focuses “primarily on the
taxation of income, which can be thought of as the sum of consumption and
saving”). The federal government does, however, levy excise taxes on designated
goods, often with the policy goal of decreasing the use of those goods. See Babak A.
Rastgoufard, Too Much Smoke and Not Enough Mirrors: The Case Against Excise Taxes and
for Gasoline Taxes, 36 URB. LAW. 411, 417-20 (2004) (noting that while they have
waned in importance, federal excise taxes comprised over three percent of federal
revenues in 2000, and that excise taxes have become an increasingly important
component of state income). See generally Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical
Perspective, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31,
50-52 (William F. Shughart III ed., 1997) (chronicling the advent of excise taxes on
seven types of products and services, including cars, firearms, and toxic chemicals).
11. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 89-90 (2d ed. 1995) (noting exceptional states, such
as Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Dakota, that tax most general services).
12. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet: State and Local Taxes,
http://www.treasury.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/state-local.shtml (last visited
Oct. 27, 2006) (labeling the state retail sales tax “a regressive tax” that “can pose
problems”); Press Release, Tx. State Rep. Garnet Coleman, Coleman Warns Against
Raising Regressive Sales Tax (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.house.state.tx.us/news/
release.php?id=804 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (cautioning that a hike in the state
sales tax rate would unduly harm the state’s poorest residents). But see DUE &
MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 9-12 (cautioning that while several studies note the direct,
inverse relationship between income level and the portion of income spent on sales
taxes, this disparity may be exaggerated because of the relationship between sales
taxes and the costs of factor production, the indexing of Social Security and welfare
payments, and the lifetime income theory); Kenneth Trager & H. Frank Williams, A
Treatment of Intermediate Transactions and Supply Elasticities in the Incidence of Sales Tax,
in THE SALES TAX IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at 204, 215 (finding through
regression analysis of data obtained in Florida that previous empirical findings
purporting regressive consequences of sales and use taxes “can be explained largely
by the [researchers’] various shifting assumptions” of the price elasticity of goods,
rather than attributed to the tax scheme itself).
13. See DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 75 (adding that, aside from equity
concerns, states may elect not to tax purchases on select tangible goods or services
“to avoid collection problems” or merely because of successful lobbying efforts that
“reflect the political strength of particular [trade] groups”); cf. id. at 91 (admitting
that the primary reason that state and local governments have typically not taxed
services is that “it is virtually impossible to delineate services that are production
inputs from those that are consumption purchases.”
14. See generally LAIM EBRILL, MICHAEL KEEN, JEAN-PAUL BODIN & VICTORIA
SUMMERS, THE MODERN VAT 1-4 (2001) (explaining that a VAT, intended to replace
consumption taxes such as a sales tax, is a levy that occurs at each stage of a good’s
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States began assessing sales taxes during the Great Depression.
Mississippi was the first state to impose a retail sales tax, in 1932, and
16
Local governments also began
many others soon followed.
17
imposing sales taxes, beginning with New York City in 1934. In
1940, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state
18
sales tax, as assessed on typical retail sales within the state. The
Supreme Court later concluded that states could levy a sales tax on
interstate transactions when the transaction itself involved a
significant physical presence in the taxing state, even when the
19
transaction also involved some physical presence in other states.
It soon became apparent that states could not levy a sales tax on
merchants who did not have a significant presence within the state,
nor on transactions that occurred fully outside the state, even if the
20
consumer subsequently brought the good into the state. To create
revenue in the face of such obstacles, states with sales taxes began to
employ a companion tax, known as the use tax, levied on the same
production process and “provi[des] for tax payable to be reduced by the tax paid [by
the producer] in respect of purchases”); id. at 25-39 (concluding that empirical
evidence of the VAT’s supposed efficiency, in terms of raising government revenue
and minimizing private economic distortions, has not fully confirmed economic
theory, in part because data available for analysis is necessarily cross-sectional, rather
than panel data); RICHARD W. LINDHOLM, VALUE-ADDED TAX AND OTHER TAX REFORMS
27-57 (1976) (describing the VAT system used in Europe, though it was originally
conceived in the United States, and the minimal economic distortion the VAT causes
in consumer habits and well-being).
15. H.R. REP. NO. 89-565, at 608 (1965).
16. William F. Fox, Importance of the Sales Tax in the 21st Century, in THE SALES TAX
IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at 1, 1; see DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 3
(listing the effective year in which each state instituted a sales tax, and whether that
tax was ever allowed to expire).
17. Fox, supra note 16, at 1. Local taxation issues are mentioned here merely to
flag their importance. For simplicity, this Comment concentrates on the legal
framework for state sales and use taxation under the STP and does not conduct a
separate analysis of the authority of local sales and use taxation.
18. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1940) (rejecting a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a Kentucky bank deposit tax because the use of banks was
not considered “a privilege of national citizenship” and noting that so long as state
policies remained otherwise constitutional, “the power of the state over taxation is
plenary”); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 (1940)
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187 (1824)) (arguing that states operate
within their constitutional powers so long as they do not impose a tax that interferes
with commerce between multiple states or nations).
19. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278-80, 288-89 (1977)
(rejecting the contention of a carrier that shipped vehicles to Mississippi for retail
sale that Mississippi could not levy a sales tax on this transaction because state
taxation on the “privilege of doing business” in a state as part of an interstate
transaction was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause).
20. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328-30 (1944) (articulating the
distinction between a sales tax, which restricts the freedom to purchase, and a use
tax, which is levied upon the free use of an item, and explaining that while use taxes
may be constitutional, they are not legally interchangeable with sales taxes, despite
similar revenue-generating results).
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21

types of tangible goods covered by sales taxes. States have typically
levied a use tax when the state could not tax the purchase itself, and
22
have generally set the use tax at the same rate as their sales tax.
Under a use tax, the state taxes the citizen’s use of the good, not its
actual purchase, since the state only has clear authority over the
citizen, not the foreign merchant. The use tax was meant to cover a
gap in sales taxation, so a consumer is generally allowed to deduct
from his use tax liability any sales tax that he paid to another state at
23
the time of purchase. Thus, the intended effect of the companion
use and sales taxes was to assure that state residents paid at least the
same total tax for a good, whether it was purchased in state or out of
24
state.
Whether the tax was collected from the citizen or the
merchant, it was the citizen’s consumption of goods that funded the
state coffers.
25
Courts have held that use taxes are within the states’ power.
Indeed, the Supreme Court found that by instituting an equivalent
use tax on tangible goods, a state effectively imposed a uniform tax
burden on its citizens’ consumption, regardless of where they bought
26
an item.
While states possessed the power to tax the use or
consumption of goods purchased out of state by residents,
27
implementation of this power remained difficult. Monitoring the
purchase of all products by residents of a state was, and is, nearly
impossible, and many residents today are not even aware of their use
21. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 16.01.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 16.01(2) (explaining the history of sales tax and suggesting that this gap
caused states to fear a loss of local merchants’ business as well as a loss of revenue for
the state).
24. Id.
25. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940) (decreeing that states
maintain “the sovereignty to manage their own affairs except only as the
requirements of the Constitution otherwise provide”).
26. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 66 (1963)
(citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)) (claiming that the
controversy over use taxes was no longer whether a state may implement them, but
whether it implements them in a manner that provides complete uniformity of
consumption taxes within the state).
27. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GDC/OCE-00-165, SALES
TAXES: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE
UNCERTAIN 19-21 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/g600165.pdf#
search=%22%22sales%20taxes%3A%20electronic%20commerce%20growth%20pres
ents%20challenges%22%22 (conceding that, depending on assumptions, estimates
of state losses in revenue due to an inability to collect use taxes from interstate
Internet sales in 2003 varied between $2.5 billion and $20.4 billion); MICH. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, FACTS ON INTERNET AND MAIL ORDER PURCHASES, http://www.michigan.
gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1750_2143-5931—,00.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006)
(estimating that consumers neglecting to inform Michigan of remote purchases, and
not paying the appropriate use tax, would cost the Michigan government $349
million in fiscal year 2005, affecting both educational and general funding).
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tax obligations. Not surprisingly, then, use taxes yield much less
revenue for states than sales taxes because collecting funds from
consumers is much more difficult than from merchants.
Over time, enforcing sales and use taxes has increased in political
importance because state revenue has, in large part, become
28
As America’s consumption habits
dependant on these taxes.
change, states will face a number of challenges in order to continue
extracting the same, or higher, revenue. For example, in 1970, U.S.
consumers spent $357 billion on goods and $291.5 billion on services,
29
a ratio of 1.22. In 2005, consumers spent $3,590.9 billion on goods
30
Because states
and $5,154.9 billion on services, a ratio of 0.70.
generally tax only tangible goods, consumer substitution of services
31
for goods has eroded the tax base for state sales and use taxes.
In addition, American consumers have continually changed their
methods of purchasing goods. Online retail sales have become a
significant part of the American economy, projected to grow by more
32
than twenty percent from 2005 to 2006. In fact, recent research by
the Department of Commerce indicates that local economies in
communities where Internet access has been broadly available grew
more rapidly between 1998 and 2002 than those of typical American
33
communities.
Internet sales are more likely than traditional retail
28. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 16, at 2 (showing that, according to the Bureau of the
Census, the share of state revenues derived from general sales and gross receipt taxes
rose from 24.9% in 1962 to 33.0% in 1994); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATE TAX COLLECTIONS: 2005, http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/0500
usstax.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (showing that general sales and gross receipts
taxes comprised 32.8% of all taxes collected by the states).
29. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, TABLE 2.3.5:
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR TYPE OF PRODUCT, http://www.bea.
gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=65&FirstYear=1970&LastYear=2
005&Freq=Ann (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). Figures are in 1970 dollars and include
both durable and non-durable goods.
30. Id. Figures are in 2005 dollars and include both durable and non-durable
goods.
31. See Fox, supra note 16, at 3-4, 7 & Table 1.4 (showing the decline in the share
of consumption of goods versus services from 1979 to 1995, and discussing the
resulting loss in expected revenue for states).
32. Enid Burns, Online Retail Revenues to Reach $200 Billion, CLICKZ, June 5, 2005,
http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3611181 (last visited Nov. 8, 2006)
(summarizing a report conducted by Shop.org that projected total Internet retail
sales of $211 billion in 2006, and that thirty-eight percent of online consumers will be
first-time buyers).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MEASURING BROADBAND’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 4
(2006),
http://www.eda.gov/ImageCache/EDAPublic/documents/pdfdocs2006/
mitcmubbimpactreport_2epdf/v1/mitcmubbimpactreport.pdf
(concluding that,
since the end of 1999, communities with widespread broadband Internet access
experienced more rapid growth in employment, business incorporations, and
technology-oriented firms than communities without such access, yet finding no
significant difference between these communities with respect to changes in average
wages).
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sales to involve a resident buying goods from an out-of-state citizen or
business.
Since Internet-based transactions will incur nearly
unenforceable use tax liability, rather than sales tax liability, states
again face dim prospects for revenue growth.
The prospect of a changing economy that conflicts with static laws
governing state power is not a new problem. For example, in the
early twentieth century, the advent of large corporations and
interstate travel presented serious issues to the Due Process
framework originally articulated by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v.
34
Neff, which indicated that citizens could not seek relief in state
courts without showing that the state met the rigid requirements of
35
By 1945, the Court
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
confronted this tension by altering the requirements of personal
36
jurisdiction. Similarly, states formerly could not require merchants
to collect taxes on sales that physically take place out of state unless
37
that merchant owned property within the state, though the Court
38
has gradually migrated towards a similar contacts analysis.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF SALES AND USE TAXATION
A. The Foundations of State Taxation of Out-of-State Sales
In 1967, the Supreme Court explained in National Bellas Hess v.
Illinois Department of Revenue that while states were not strictly limited
by territorial bounds to enforce taxation, state power was limited by
39
two constitutional clauses —the Due Process Clause of the
40
41
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
Just as

34. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
35. Id. at 723-24 (“If the non-resident of a state has no property in the [s]tate,
there is nothing upon which the [state’s] tribunals can adjudicate.”).
36. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945) (concluding
that justice required that a company need merely decide to conduct business in a
state in order to be subject to a state’s judicial system because the privilege of doing
business within a state also carries with it legal obligations). See generally Wendy
Collins Purdue, The Story of Shaffer: Allocating Jurisdictional Authority Among the States,
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 129-34 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing
the erosion of strict territorial personal jurisdictional requirements in Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
37. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756, 759 (1967)
(suggesting that state taxation of foreign corporations presented both Due Process
and Commerce Clause concerns).
38. See infra notes 57–65 and accompanying text (noting that by 1992, the Court
no longer deemed a strict physical presence rule fair in light of a more national
economy).
39. Id. at 756.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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retailers within the state were obligated to comport with state tax
policy, the Court explained, foreign merchants, such as mail-order
retailers, were required to comply with state taxation laws unless these
42
statutes overstepped either of two related tests. First, a state can
force a foreign merchant to remit sales or use taxes under the Due
Process Clause if “the state has given anything [to the foreign
43
merchant] for which it can ask return.” Second, a state can force a
foreign merchant to remit sales or use taxes under the Commerce
Clause only when the tax is “justified as designed to make such
commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose
44
protection it enjoys.”
The Court concluded that for National Bellas Hess, an out-of-state
mail-order company that did not engage in local advertising and
conducted all transactions via a common carrier (such as the U.S.
Postal Service), it was “difficult to conceive of commercial
45
transactions more exclusively interstate in character.”
These
interstate transactions conducted solely via a common carrier lacked
a sufficient “nexus” with the state—“some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the [entity] or transaction
[the state] seeks to tax”—such as a merchant’s physical presence
46
Therefore, foreign merchants were not
within the taxing state.
47
obligated to remit use taxes.
The Court noted one additional,
practical concern: a merchant’s mere interaction with an in-state

42. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (acknowledging that the claims that the state
use tax law violated the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause were “closely
related”).
43. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)). The Court’s
due process analysis is essentially an inquiry into the balance of forcing a foreign
citizen to comply with a state law and providing justice for the party asking for
enforcement—in this case, the state. See infra Part III.A (outlining due process
jurisprudence and applying it to the STP).
44. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249,
253 (1946)).
45. Id. at 759.
46. Id. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954)); see, e.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 362, 364 (1941)
(ruling that Iowa could tax interstate sales destined for that state because the
merchant owned retail outlets within Iowa, even though the Iowa retail outlets were
not involved in the taxed transactions); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 62, 64-66 (1939) (finding that the presence of two salesmen who solicited orders
and stored and distributed merchandise in California constituted a physical presence
of the Illinois firm within California, subjecting the transactions to California tax
law).
47. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (explaining that a state cannot legally impose
use taxes upon a merchant “whose only connection with . . . the [s]tate is by common
carrier or [the] mail”).
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48

customer could not constitute a substantial nexus. Otherwise, a firm
of almost any size would quickly be forced to comply with tax statutes
from “every other political subdivision throughout the nation with
49
power to impose sales and use taxes.” There were already 2,300
50
By virtue of its sheer
jurisdictions imposing such taxes in 1967.
complexity, the Court reasoned, the local taxation system, as applied
to purely interstate transactions, was contrary to “[t]he very purpose
51
of the Commerce Clause.”
While the Court in National Bellas Hess suggested that without a
merchant’s physical presence within a state it would be difficult to
justify burdening a foreign merchant with compliance with local
52
taxation rules, the justification for that pronouncement has
gradually come under pressure.
First, interstate transactions
conducted through a common carrier have continued to grow in
importance to the economy. By 1990, fifty-four percent of Americans
had made a mail-order purchase in the previous year, and mail-order
53
purchases accounted for fifteen percent of retail sales. Second, the
Court continued to adjust due process jurisprudence to comport with
the changing economy and the resulting disputes. The Court
allowed more tenuous contacts between a party and a given forum to
serve as a sufficient basis on which to establish jurisdiction, so long as
54
the contacts were voluntary. Third, in 1977, the Supreme Court
rejected previous case law that had supported the rule that a state
could not directly tax transactions that were defined as interstate

48. See id. (citing Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45) (noting that a seller’s
newspaper and radio advertisement in a state where it has no retail outlets had not
previously constituted a sufficient nexus for imposition of a use tax).
49. Id. at 759.
50. Id. at 759 n.12 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-565 (1965)). A more recent estimate
pegs that figure at 7,500 jurisdictions that levy a retail tax. See Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement: States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax Collection From Remote Vendors:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 27 (2003) (statement of George S. Isaacson, Tax Counsel,
Direct Marketing Association) (contending that the sheer number of new laws with
which firms would be forced to comply under the STP outweighs any potential
simplification of tax rates or collection mechanisms).
51. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760.
52. See id. at 756-57 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946))
(identifying the sole justification for state taxation of interstate commerce as the “fair
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys,” and listing
several instances where the Court has upheld taxation of a foreign merchant, all of
which include some physical presence in the state).
53. North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d 203, 209, rev’d, 504 U.S. 306 (1992)
(citing TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 63; DIRECT MARKETING, July 1990, at 30).
54. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (decreeing that
a business that purposefully avails itself of the benefits of the taxing state has
subjected itself to the state’s legal authority).
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55

commerce. Instead, the Court applied a four-part test to assess the
56
validity of a state tax on an interstate transaction.
In 1992, the Supreme Court addressed these mounting tensions in
57
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.
While the Court acknowledged the
growing importance of interstate transactions to the national
58
economy, the majority was more concerned with enunciating a finer
distinction between the dual limitations on state power—the
59
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
The Quill Court noted that a due process analysis was
fundamentally concerned with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice” for the foreign merchants, as portrayed in
60
International Shoe v. Washington, not the physical realities of the
61
merchants’ business. In particular, the Court in Quill, in contrast to
National Bellas Hess, applied the similar principles of personal
jurisdiction and found that a firm was subject to the taxes of a state if
62
it “purposefully directed” its activities to the forum in question. The
inquiry, the Court insinuated, was no longer merely a factual
investigation into whether the firm in question owned a particular
63
asset, but whether the relationship between the firm and the state
64
was a reasonable basis on which to enforce the law. Specifically, the
Court ruled that when a firm intentionally sent mailings to state

55. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(emphasizing that the parties stipulated that the merchant had engaged in
significant activities within Mississippi, and that the only issue was whether the
interstate nature of the transaction barred state authority); see also supra note 19
(discussing the previous cases that the Court rejected in Complete Auto).
56. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (ruling that state taxation is valid when the “tax
[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly
apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly
related to the services provided by the state”) (emphasis added).
57. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
58. See id. at 303-04, 314 (agreeing with the North Dakota Supreme Court that
far-reaching changes in the national economy and the evolution of cases rendered
the Nat’l Bellas Hess holding obsolete).
59. See id. at 305 (stressing that “[t]he two constitutional requirements differ
fundamentally, in several ways” and are “analytically distinct”) (emphasis added); see
also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recommending that judges approach
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause issues separately), cited in Quill, 504 U.S.
at 305.
60. Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
61. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
62. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476
(1985)).
63. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (applying the “notions of fair
play and substantial justice” standard to jurisdiction over physical assets).
64. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (favoring the flexible contacts inquiry over the more
formalistic physical presence test).
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residents, it subjected itself to personal jurisdiction, and therefore
65
was also subject to that state’s use tax under the Due Process Clause.
The Quill Court noted that, in contrast to the Due Process Clause,
the Commerce Clause does not explicitly prohibit state action in the
66
absence of congressional action. While outlining the history of the
67
Commerce Clause’s negative power, the Court affirmed its narrow
68
contemporary use of the doctrine.
That restricted approach
prohibited states from imposing taxes only when the statute violated
one of the four prongs of the test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
69
Brady. Indeed, the first prong of Complete Auto, that the tax must be
70
applied to “an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state,”
aptly described the reasoning of National Bellas Hess—that a
merchant’s physical presence in the taxing state is the strongest
71
indication of this nexus. The Court cited supporting cases in which
firms lacked a physical presence in the taxing state and the Court
found that their minor contacts with the forum were insufficient to
72
form a nexus under the Commerce Clause.
The Quill Court
65. Id. at 308; cf. Adventure Commc’ns., Inc. v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 191
F.3d 429, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying a minimum contacts analysis to conclude that
a Kentucky statute regulating West Virginia firms was within Kentucky’s legislative
jurisdiction). But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(flagging the distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction,
which are not identical, but have not fully been defined); cf. Gerling Global
Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (declaring that
under a legislative Due Process analysis, a state cannot enforce its laws “beyond its
borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of other states to make a
contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where made”).
66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
67. See infra Part III.B (explaining the strict dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
and detailing the Court’s use of it).
68. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-11 (explaining the Court’s decisions in prior cases such
as Bellas Hess and Complete Auto and concluding that these cases are not inconsistent
with its modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
69. Id. (citing P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
§§ 2:9-2:17 (1981)); see also supra note 56 (defining the four prongs of the Complete
Auto test); infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the Complete Auto Court intended to end
lower courts’ confusion over how to adjudicate disputes concerning state taxation
power under the Commerce Clause).
70. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
71. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977), which distinguished “between mail-order
sellers with [a physical presence in the taxing] State and those . . . who do no more
than communicate with customers in the State . . . by common carrier”); see Nat’l
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 754, 758 (1967) (reaffirming the
distinction between merchants who are physically present in the taxing state and
those who are not).
72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. Compare Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989)
(finding that the route of an interstate telephone call, by itself, did not provide a
substantial nexus for the state to tax that call), and Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59
(holding that the “receipt of mail [in the state, by itself,] provides insufficient nexus”
for taxation), with D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988)

EVANS.OFFTOPRINTER

2006

1/9/2007 1:12:23 PM

SEPARATE BUT TAXED

433

cautioned, however, that the “slightest” physical presence of a firm in
73
the taxing state did not constitute a substantial nexus.
The Court’s explanation of what exactly constitutes a substantial
74
nexus with a state has not been fully explored. Some commentators
contend that the Court’s intention in Quill was to create a bright-line
rule whereby a firm with any real physical presence within a state
qualified as taxable under a state’s ability to regulate transactions
75
without violating the Commerce Clause. Others see the Quill rule as
more flexible, in which individual courts may determine the level of
76
physical presence in a state needed to qualify as a substantial nexus.
B. The States Devise the Streamlined Sales Tax Project to Preserve Revenue in
the Internet Age
Amidst the continuing uncertainty over the extent of state taxation
authority, common-carrier interstate transactions have gained
77
importance to the national economy.
In particular, so-called e78
commerce transactions, purchases made via the Internet, have
(concluding that a merchant had sufficient contacts with Louisiana where the firm
both sent catalogs to Louisiana residents and maintained thirteen retail locations
there), and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981)
(upholding a Montana tax on the portion of coal extracted by a firm from within the
state, because the physical presence of the good satisfied the criteria of substantial
nexus).
73. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8 (declaring that the presence of “a few floppy
diskettes” in North Dakota did not constitute a substantial nexus).
74. See Jaime Klima, Mom & Pop v. Dot-Com: A Disparity in Taxation Based on How
You Shop?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0028, 4-5 (2002) (contending that online
retailers are unsure when their businesses have satisfied a definition of “substantial
nexus”).
75. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 560 (rejecting the argument that a firm
with a physical presence within a state that is wholly unrelated to the transaction at
issue should not qualify as a substantial nexus with the state); H. Beau Baez III, The
Rush to the Goblin Market: The Blurring of Quill’s Two Nexus Tests, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
581, 595 (2006) (positing that “the Quill Court . . . created a simple bright-line test
measured by physical presence in a state”).
76. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 430 U.S. at 555-56 (implying, through the term
“sufficient nexus,” that a slight physical presence in a state was not sufficient under
the Commerce Clause); Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362 (Fla.
1996) (using several factors to determine whether a substantial nexus existed);
Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1996) (including
considerations of fairness to the merchant).
77. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, E-STATS: 2004, 2 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/papers/2004/2004reportfinal.pdf (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006) (showing that while total domestic shipment revenues rose
7.6% from 2003 to 2004, shipments sent through e-commerce orders rose 14.4%
over the same time period).
78. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, E-STATS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/faq.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2006) (defining e-commerce as “the value of goods and services sold . . . [via] use of
the internet, intranet, extranet, as well as proprietary networks that run systems such
as Electronic Data Interchange”).
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79

become commonplace.
As the number of purchases with
ambiguous tax liability continues to grow, the states have become
80
Some
increasingly concerned that their revenues may decrease.
firms have reacted to their understanding of the Court’s taxation
rules by legally bifurcating online operations from physical stores in
81
an attempt to avoid a substantial nexus with taxing states. On the
other hand, those firms with a significant physical and online
presence have attempted to cooperate with state taxing authorities in
82
an effort to reduce legal costs.
The potential loss of revenue from non-taxed online sales,
however, did prompt states to join in a coordinated effort that they
83
dubbed the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (“STP”).
The STP,
organized and executed by the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”),
84
a policy and lobbying group of the collective states, is an attempt to
maintain the states’ revenue base in the midst of a changing
85
economy.
Member states appear concerned not only over the
79. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, E-STATS: 2004, supra note 77, at 2 (documenting
$130 billion in 2004 consumer Internet purchases, the type of transaction that has
replaced catalog sales); CARRIE JOHNSON, THE GROWTH OF MULTICHANNEL RETAILING 4
(July 2004), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/0407MULTICHANNEL.PDF
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (estimating, based on data through 2003, that 2007
consumer Internet purchases will reach $204 billion).
80. See DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM F. FOX, STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX REVENUE
LOSSES FROM E-COMMERCE: ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2004 (DRAFT) 4 (2004), available at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0407ecommerce.PDF (last visited Oct. 30, 2006)
(estimating that state and local governments had already lost between $15.5 billion
and $16.1 billion due to untaxed Internet sales in 2003).
81. The New Rules Project: Internet Sales Tax Fairness, http://www.newrules.
org /retail/inttax2.html, (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (highlighting the practice known
as “entity isolation”). States have reacted in mixed ways to this legal strategy. See id.
(finding that by 2005, six states had enacted legislation rejecting entity isolation as a
valid means of avoiding state tax collection, while courts in three other states upheld
entity isolation).
82. See Brian Krebs, States Move Forward on Internet Sales Tax,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, July 1, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070101475.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006)
(reporting that a suit brought by Illinois against several major retailers resulted in
settlement, rather than protracted litigation).
83. See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX
PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2005), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax
.org/execsum0105.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (claiming that the project is an
effort to “simplify and modernize sales and use tax collection”).
84. See About the Multistate Tax Commission, http://www.mtc.gov/About
.aspx?id=40 (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) (outlining the composition and goals of the
MTC).
85. See MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK, 4 (2003), available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Resources/Studie
s_and_Reports/Federalism_at_Risk/FedatRisk--FINALREPORT.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2006) (emphasizing that the MTC hopes that the STP “make[s] it easier for
retailers, including remote sellers, to collect . . . tax[es],” though also admitting the
collective states’ concern over the increasing “ineffectiveness of state sales and use
taxes” to collect revenues served as additional motivation to enact the STP).
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possibly limited power to tax Internet commerce specifically, but also
that, more broadly, the interstate nature of the economy will
86
continually erode state authority. The MTC has specifically cited
87
federalist tensions with respect to recent congressional acts. For
example, a federal law enacted in 2000 prohibits a state from
imposing corporate taxes on a firm that maintains no physical
88
presence within that state. Additionally, Congress has twice passed
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which forbids a state from imposing
89
most taxes on Internet access service, among other prohibitions.
This Act, while directly relevant to the STP, does not specifically
outlaw the collection of sales or use taxes, nor did federal legislators
90
or other officials intend to undercut this state revenue source.
91
Currently, forty-four states have agreed to participate in the STP.
These participating states have simplified their extraterritorial
taxation laws as part of passing the STP’s Uniform Sales and Use Tax
92
Agreement. The simplification of taxation is a direct response to
the complexity of compliance arguments advanced by the Supreme

86. See id. at 3 (asserting that “[t]he authority to tax is a key element of state
sovereignty” as outlined by the Constitution).
87. See id. at 27-31 (discussing both taxation and non-taxation federalist concerns
shared by the states).
88. See Interstate Income Tax Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391 (2000) (limiting the
states’ ability to levy income taxes on the proceeds from sales collected by individuals,
or businesses, who had no physical presence in the taxing state, but who ship orders
to the taxing state). But cf. Tax Comm’r of W.Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 04-AA-157,
2006 WL 3455005 (W. Va. 2006) (concluding that the Quill decision applied only to
state authority to levy sales and use taxes).
89. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)(Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax
Freedom Act, §§ 1101-1104) (prohibiting states from levying taxes on Internet access
services, collecting Internet-only taxes, such as taxes on emails or bandwidth, and
instituting multiple taxation of e-commerce). This law expires on November 1, 2007.
See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a) (extending the expiration of the act by four
additional years).
90. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101(a)-(b) (prohibiting taxes on internet access
but otherwise preserving the states’ authority to impose taxes); see U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 4 (July 1, 1997),
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewk.wpd (last visited Oct. 30, 2006)
(declaring that the United States believes that “no new taxes should be imposed on
Internet commerce”) (emphasis added). See generally Brian Fagan, Note, Taxation of
Electronic Commerce: Avoiding an Inroad upon Federalism, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 465, 470-74
(2001) (examining the overlapping introduction and passage of the Internet Tax
Freedom Act and the discussion of goals for Internet taxation published by the
Clinton Administration).
91. Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Sales Tax Simplification
Agreement Becomes Effective Today and Launches Key Element: Amnesty Program
(Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/press_rel/Press%20
Release%20Inaugural%20Gov%20Board%20-%20Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
92. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX
PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 1-2.
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93

Court in both National Bellas Hess and Quill, instituting a simpler
94
In
taxation structure to which all participating states assent.
particular, under the STP, merchants must choose to use one of
three software programs that calculate the correct tax rate to charge
95
the customer without any individual effort by the merchant.
The states participating in the STP have agreed to five basic rules
to determine the “source” of the sale for sales or use tax purposes.
First, if the customer physically picks up the item from the merchant,
96
that location is used for taxation purposes. Second, if the customer
does not pick up the product, and the merchant knows the
destination of the product, then the destination state is designated
97
the “source” state. If neither of the above methods yields a “source”
state, then the merchant may use any known location of the customer
98
from the merchant’s business records to designate a “source” state.
If none of the above options is available, the merchant uses the
99
customer’s billing address, obtained during the transaction. Finally,
if none of the above options is available, the merchant uses the origin
100
of shipping, which is typically the merchant’s location.
Once a “source” state is determined, the merchant charges the
101
consumer that state’s tax rate.
The merchant’s software is
programmed to implement the five-step procedure and instruct the
102
merchant to collect the appropriate level of tax.
As a further reflection of the uncertainty of state power to tax
interstate Internet sales, the STP also offers merchants an
opportunity to gain amnesty for all past tax collection activity.
93. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967)
(noting the “virtual welter of complicated obligations” that state taxation may impose
on foreign merchants); North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (N.D.
1991) (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess and considering the potential burden of complex tax
obligations on foreign merchants); see also supra Part II.A (explaining the significance
of these cases with regard to the power of states to tax interstate transactions).
94. See MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK, supra note 85, at 20-21
(explaining the origin of the STP).
95. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX
PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 2-3.
96. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement § 310(A)(1), available at
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/SSUTA_Amended041806.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2006).
97. Id. § 310 (A)(2).
98. Id. § 310 (A)(3).
99. Id. § 310 (A)(4).
100. Id. § 310 (A)(5).
101. Anthony D. Milewski, Jr., Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: Is Your
Business Ready for Compliance?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7 (Oct. 24, 2005) (citing
Forest Lewis & Curtis Ruppal, Streamlined Sales/Use Tax Biggest Change in 70 Years,
MICH. FORWARD 16 (Sept./Oct. 2004)).
102. STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES TAX
PROJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 83, at 2-3.
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Amnesty is available in exchange for merchants adopting and
implementing the STP software within twelve months of either:
(1) the software becoming available; or (2) the applicable state
103
joining the STP.
Some retailers have already taken advantage of
104
the amnesty offer and are implementing STP systems.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STREAMLINED SALES TAX PROJECT
Any potential challenge by a foreign merchant reluctant to collect
use taxes under the STP of a foreign state would have to assert that
105
the STP is unconstitutional.
Thus, a plaintiff would have to
demonstrate that the STP, as enforced, violated the Due Process
Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the general structure of governance
articulated in the Constitution.
Given the careful planning by the MTC, it would not be surprising
if courts were to uphold the STP as constitutional. Practically
speaking, the STP provides more certainty for merchants facing
potential lawsuits, and allows the state revenues to grow with the
economy. This Part shows, however, that this practical advantage is
gained at the expense of deviating from established structures of
governance. As discussed below, a challenge to the STP on due
process grounds is not likely to succeed because the changing due
process standards embraced by the Supreme Court have adapted to
106
the interstate nature of the nation’s commercial activities.
However, the Court is much more likely to accept a challenge to the
STP as a violation of the Commerce Clause. Commerce Clause
103. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, § 402(A)(1).
104. Krebs, supra note 82.
105. A foreign merchant cannot challenge the STP as a violation of a federal
statute because Congress has not passed a law that directly governs the legality of the
STP. See S. 152 CONG. REC. S14191 (Dec. 20, 2005) (proposing to approve the STP
through Congress’ Commerce Clause authority). It is also unlikely that a foreign
merchant could challenge the STP as a violation of a state constitution, not only
because these documents are not designed to govern interstate law, but also because
state constitutions tend to grant the broadest possible state legislative authority. See,
e.g., CA. CONST. art. IV §§ 1, 8(c)(3) (decreeing that “[t]he legislative power of this
State is vested in the California legislature,” and further implying that the legislature
is authorized to levy taxes by stating that “statutes providing for tax levies . . . for the
usual current expense of the state . . . shall go into effect immediately upon their
enactment”); ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 1 (declaring that the state legislature “shall
have full power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the
defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to this Constitution,
nor to that of the United States”). Finally, a foreign merchant cannot challenge the
STP on the basis that it violates state law because state legislatures have replaced
former taxing regimes with the STP. See Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax
Project, supra note 91 (stating that all participating states had passed identical tax
regulations).
106. See infra Part III.A (discussing the modern changes in due process case law).
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jurisprudence has vacillated over time and has thus not provided
clear guidance to states or foreign merchants as to when states may
107
tax transactions of an interstate nature. Finally, the Court may also
be more likely to embrace a challenge to the STP on grounds that it
is contrary to the federalist structure enunciated by the Constitution,
as the STP allows the states to collectively encroach on federal
108
power.
A. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause
The STP will likely survive a due process challenge, given the
109
Court’s broad approach to multiple jurisdiction disputes. It is well
established that a state has not violated a citizen’s due process rights
when that citizen has “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits
and privileges of conducting business within the state because such
purposeful action constitutes the minimum contact necessary for the
110
Indeed, the
state to obtain personal jurisdiction over that citizen.
Court has directly applied this standard to assess a firm’s minimum
111
contacts with a state in the context of catalog sales.
While the Court has never ruled that catalog sales are analogous to
Internet transactions, lower courts have begun to implicitly make that
112
logical assumption. In Mink v. AAAA Development, Inc., for example,
the Fifth Circuit identified a three-tiered classification of Internet
113
activity for assessing a foreign firm’s contacts with the forum state.
The court found that when a “defendant clearly does business over the
Internet by entering into contracts with residents of other states . . .
114
personal jurisdiction [over him] is proper.”
The court classified a
107. See infra Part III.B (deciphering applicable commerce clause jurisprudence).
108. See infra Part III.C (analyzing the appropriate balance of power between state
and federal government).
109. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the constitutional interplay of the Commerce
Clause and the Due Process Clause in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding interstate
sales taxes).
110. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (finding that a
franchisee had “purposefully availed” itself of the Florida forum where the franchisee
conducted business with a Florida franchisor and agreed to a contractual forum
selection clause).
111. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (upholding the Court’s
pronouncement in Burger King that a firm need not be physically present in a state to
be subject to its judicial enforcement; the firm need merely interact intentionally
with the forum).
112. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
113. See id. at 336-37 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)) (applying the principles of Zippo to AAAA to find that
the firm’s website, which allowed users to download an order form, but not directly
to place an order, did not constitute grounds upon which AAAA was subject to
personal jurisdiction).
114. Id. at 336 (emphasis added) (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
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second tier of websites, “[i]n the middle of the spectrum” of contacts
with the forum, where a firm operated a “website that allows a user to
115
exchange information with a host computer.” In the last tier, in which
personal jurisdiction is unlikely, the “defendant merely established a
passive website that does nothing more than advertise on the
116
website.” Thus, to the extent that contracts formed on the basis of
a catalog solicitation have been replaced by similar transactions on
the Internet, they are nonetheless intentional business transactions
117
that satisfy a minimum contacts analysis. Certainly, like a sale from
a catalog, an Internet sale is more than a mere exchange of
information; it is an example of a merchant clearly conducting
118
business.
Other circuits have not embraced the three-tiered classification of
Internet activity, but have nonetheless held that any firm that
willingly establishes and maintains a website open to commercial
transactions has satisfied the purposeful minimum contacts
119
requirements of personal jurisdiction.
In fact, some courts have
considered the vast potential of direct Internet sales as a factor
weighing towards declaring firms using the technology subject to
120
general jurisdiction.
Based on federal courts’ growing acceptance
115. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. (1996)).
116. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997)).
117. See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (finding that catalog sales
made “in continuous and widespread solicitation of business” within a state satisfied
the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause); Zippo, 952 F. Supp.
at 1126 (employing a minimum contacts test to assert personal jurisdiction over a
website company that had 3,000 subscribers and seven contracts with Internet service
providers within the forum state).
118. Compare Mink, 190 F.3d at 336 (finding a court lacked personal jurisdiction
over a website that did not transact business, only posted information, over the
Internet), with Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126 (finding personal jurisdiction over website
that entered sales contracts with state citizens over the Internet).
119. E.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying a so-called “sliding scale” for Internet based firms: when firms clearly
conduct business over the Internet, if the transactions are “continuous and
systematic,” then personal jurisdiction is appropriate); cf. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d
467, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing the important difference between cases involving
commercial transactions, such as Zippo and Mink, and cases scrutinizing noncommercial websites, where “visitor[s] may participate in an open forum hosted by
[a] website,” and concluding that such non-commercial cases, such as defamation
cases, should follow the guidelines articulated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
(1984)); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002)
(declaring that a state has personal jurisdiction over any firm operating a website
“specifically intended [to] interact[] with residents of the state”).
120. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000) (insinuating that regular and substantial Internet sales may serve as
grounds for finding the existence of general jurisdiction, but finding that
maintaining a passive website falls far short of the contacts necessary to approximate
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of personal jurisdiction over firms with well-established Internet sites
engaged in commercial activity, it is unlikely that a foreign merchant
121
could successfully challenge the STP on due process grounds.
B. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Likely Violates the Commerce Clause
If a foreign merchant challenged the STP on Commerce Clause
grounds, courts likely would be more receptive. Quite distinct from
due process concerns, Commerce Clause challenges to state taxation
122
have left considerable confusion in the judiciary.
In part, this
confusion appears to stem from exactly which types of state actions
the Commerce Clause prohibits. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s
attitude of how restricted the states are by the Commerce Clause has
historically tended to sway along with its approach to libertarian
123
ideals.
In reality, much of the confusion can be explained by the
fact that in earlier decisions, the Court often, but not always,
embraced a stricter interpretation of the Commerce Clause, often

physical presence). But see Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (citing Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing the contention that
even a frequently visited website could constitute grounds for general jurisdiction
because “while [the foreign firm] may be doing business with Texas, it is not doing
business in Texas”); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 2002) (ruling that
Ohio courts lacked general jurisdiction over a non-resident business that registered
Internet domain names despite the fact that: (1) the defendant maintained a
website open for commercial transactions with Ohio residents; and (2) over 4,000
Ohio residents had, in fact, registered domain names by using the defendant’s
website, while noting that Ohio did have personal jurisdiction over the firm).
121. But see Quill, 504 U.S. at 319-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stressing
the distinction between adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction, though
admitting that the Court has never fully enunciated these differences).
122. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-12 (explaining that the North Dakota Supreme
Court had confused a Commerce Clause inquiry with a Due Process Clause inquiry);
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274-75 (1977) (bemoaning that
the “perennial problem of the validity of a state tax [under the Commerce Clause]”
has long been a “troublesome area” for the courts) (internal quotation omitted).
123. Compare Specter Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1952)
(stating that strictly interstate transactions, as opposed to those involving local
business, could not be taxed by the states), Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 276
(1946) (suggesting that the purpose of the Commerce Clause was to promote free
trade among the states, and that allowing states to tax these transactions was contrary
to this purpose), and Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 447-48 (1827) (declaring that
the power to tax intercourse among the states resided solely in the realm of
Congress), with D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) (holding that
firms engaged in interstate commerce must pay their “fair share” of the state tax
burden), Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 1084 (disavowing the formalistic approach of
deciding which interstate transaction taxes were unconstitutional based on the
language of the taxing statute), and Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250, 256-59 (1933) (implying that state taxation of interstate commerce was
illegitimate only in cases where foreign merchants experienced disparate tax
treatment as compared to in-state merchants).
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termed the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause.
The
dormant Commerce Clause barred states from taxing interstate
commerce, regardless of the will of Congress, if that taxation
125
significantly harmed the national interest.
The Court itself has
admitted that the strength of the dormant Commerce Clause,
126
however, has vacillated during the Court’s history.
1. A Commerce Clause analysis is governed by the Complete Auto standards
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court generally
uses the Commerce Clause only to strike down taxes violating one or
more of the four prongs it enunciated in Complete Auto, eschewing a
127
strict dormant Commerce Clause interpretation.
In Complete Auto,
the Court clarified that state taxation of interstate commerce was
constitutional when the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3]
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly
128
related to the services provided by the [s]tate.”
In applying the
Complete Auto test, the Court claims to continue the Framers’ vision of
preventing the states from sapping the strength of interstate
129
commerce for the sake of narrow interests.
Thus, the Court
purports to satisfy the goals underlying the dormant interpretation of

124. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179-81 (1995)
(confirming the Court’s adherence to the dormant Commerce Clause, noting its
purpose as a method for protecting interstate commerce, and discussing the “turns”
in the Court’s approach to the doctrine over the years).
125. Id. at 179-80 (explaining that, under this interpretation, the intent of the
Framers was to avoid “economic Balkanization” initiated by state interests “that had
plagued relations among the Colonies”).
126. Id. at 180 (bemoaning that “the Court’s understanding of the dormant
Commerce Clause has taken some turns”). See generally id. at 179-84 (summarizing
the jurisprudence of the dormant Commerce Clause and concluding that the Court
had abandoned the “formalism” of the dormant Commerce Clause by 1977, when it
issued the Complete Auto decision).
127. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309-11; see, e.g., Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184 (identifying
the central controversy in the case as satisfaction of Complete Auto’s second prong—
fair apportionment of the tax); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989)
(exploring the “wavering doctrinal lines” prior to Complete Auto’s four-part test).
128. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
129. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 180 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James
Madison) and THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7 & 11 (Alexander Hamilton) as indications of
the Framers’ concern for the stability of national commerce, deemed a necessary
ingredient for national political health); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 80
(Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (“I am willing here to allow, in its
full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States
should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own
revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that
(with the sole exception of [state] duties on imports and exports) [the individual States]
would . . . retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
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the Commerce Clause without narrowly constricting states’ ability to
130
raise revenue.
2. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project fails the substantial nexus requirement
of the Complete Auto test
Confusion notwithstanding, if the Court were to apply the Complete
Auto four-prong test to the STP, it could very well find the STP
unconstitutional. The most controversial aspect of the STP is its
relation to the first prong of Complete Auto, where the Court would
examine whether the foreign merchant maintained a “substantial
131
Given that the Court has not
nexus” within the taxing state.
defined this phrase, scholars have noted that any attempt to discuss
132
Additionally, the
the phrase on its own is a frustrating exercise.
Court has habitually used the phrase without providing a full context
for its historical use. For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
133
Jefferson Lines, the Court proclaimed that “[i]t has long been settled
that a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in
which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction
134
taxable by that State.”
Yet this broad pronouncement was made
without reference to the Court’s own long-standing “safe harbor”
principle, which exempted foreign firms that sold tangible goods to
135
state residents solely through a common carrier. The Jefferson Lines
opinion also failed to mention that a very small quantity of goods
might not qualify as a substantial nexus either, as was the case for
136
several computer disks in the 1992 Quill decision.

130. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 303-04 (explaining that the Complete Auto decision was a
direct rejection of the contention that any taxation of interstate commerce by the
states was unconstitutional); Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 179-80 (insisting that while not
all attempts by states to tax interstate commerce without congressional authorization
are unconstitutional, the Court has “consistently held [that the] language [of the
Commerce Clause] contain[s] a further, negative command, known as the dormant
Commerce Clause,” though the Court has not strictly interpreted the clause).
131. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-12 (disputing the finding of the Supreme Court of
North Dakota that the “substantial nexus” requirement under Complete Auto’s
contemplation of the Commerce Clause is equivalent to the “minimum contacts”
inquiry of the Due Process Clause, though admitting that confusion is
understandable).
132. See Baez, supra note 75, at 597 (admitting that “it is useless to try to discern
any substantive meaning from the phrases ‘substantial nexus,’ ‘sufficient nexus,’ or
‘nexus aplenty’ themselves”).
133. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
134. Id. at 184 (internal citation omitted).
135. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill.,
386 U.S. 753 (1967)).
136. Id. at 315 n.8 (citing Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 556 (1977), to explain that there is an artificial threshold below which the
court would ignore physical incursions by a foreign firm into a state).
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However, there are several theories about what may constitute a
substantial nexus, based on both case law and congressional
intervention:
the representational nexus theory; the strict or
modified physical nexus theory; and the congressionally authorized
137
nexus theory.
A review of each theory reveals that a foreign
merchant selling through the Internet does not have a substantial
nexus with a foreign state.
First, the representational nexus theory argues that strictly
Internet-based retailers have a representational presence in the
taxing state via the Internet service providers or other online services
138
that consumers within the taxing state use to access the website.
For example, if a citizen of Ohio used a local service provider, such as
a cable company, to access the Internet and complete a purchase
from a website owned by a merchant whose only physical presence
was in Maine, then the service provider acted as a conduit, physically
linking the Maine merchant to the Ohio purchase. This theory is not
without merit. In the past, the Court has held that certain
representatives of a firm who were present within a state constituted a
139
substantial nexus, satisfying the first prong of the Complete Auto test.
For example, in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of
140
Revenue, the Supreme Court found that a firm without offices or
property in Washington, but that nonetheless had sales
representatives (who were not employees) within Washington,
141
maintained a substantial nexus with the state. Therefore, the Court
held that subjecting the foreign merchant to business and occupation
142
taxes was constitutional.
The Court rationalized that the act of

137. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
unlikelihood that Congress would give states authorization to tax Internet sales). See
generally Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 617-28 (1997) (defining and dismissing the possible
arguments for states to assert a substantial nexus claim over e-commerce providers
without physical operations in a state).
138. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 619-20 (discussing the history of the
representational nexus theory and the possibility of its application to taxation over
Internet sales).
139. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (stating
that state taxation is valid if, among other requirements, the “tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State”).
140. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
141. See id. at 249-50 (noting that Tyler Pipe’s sales representatives, on Tyler Pipe’s
behalf, cultivated goodwill and positive customer relations in Washington’s highly
competitive market by routinely calling customers and soliciting orders).
142. Id. at 251 (agreeing with the Washington Supreme Court that a substantial
nexus existed because company sales representatives were responsible for
maintaining and protecting Tyler Pipe’s market interests in the state); see also Ashraf,
supra note 137, at 620 n.125 (acknowledging that a business and occupation tax is
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soliciting business within a state was certainly a substantial portion of
commerce, contributing to the firm’s well-being; such acts could thus
143
be taxed by a state.
144
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson presented a similar situation, where a
foreign firm without any physical assets in Florida hired ten
145
The Court
independent contractors to solicit orders in the state.
found that Florida’s use tax applied to the firm because the
intentional actions of the independent contractors and the firm’s
continuous solicitation of business from the state constituted
sufficient commercial activity to constitute a substantial nexus with
146
Florida.
Some scholars have argued that, under these precedents,
Internet service providers perform the identical function of the
independent salesmen by regularly and continuously soliciting orders
147
from within each state, thus constituting a substantial nexus.
However, Congress has rejected the representational nexus theory
as applied to Internet sales. Since October of 1998, The Internet Tax
Freedom Act has prohibited states from claiming that a foreign,
Internet-based firm maintains a substantial nexus with the state
“solely as a result of . . . processing of orders through the out-of-State
computer server of a provider of Internet access service or online
148
services.”
Since Congress has the explicit constitutional power to
149
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” the Internet
Tax Freedom Act has invalidated the representational nexus theory
150
as applied to Internet retailers.
Second, states may argue that a modified physical nexus
requirement for Internet retailers constitutes a substantial nexus on
151
which to base a use tax.
This argument posits that the in-state
not identical to a use tax, but that the definition of substantial nexus used by the
Court may well be the same, as applied to these taxes).
143. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249-50 (paying particular attention to the fact that
Tyler Pipe received virtually all of its market information from its in-state sales
representatives).
144. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
145. Id. at 209.
146. Id. at 211 (dismissing the distinction between full-time employees and
independent contractors as constitutionally insignificant for the purposes of a
substantial nexus analysis).
147. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 621-27 (considering, and then rejecting, three
separate arguments defining internet service providers as representatives of the firm
because these providers behave more like advertisers than active solicitors).
148. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax
Freedom Act, § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II)).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
150. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II).
151. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 627-28 (clarifying that a modified physical nexus
requirement would equate the virtual presence of the Internet with the physical
presence required under a traditional substantial nexus analysis).
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physical requirement of a firm’s assets or representatives is based on
152
Just as the notion of
an outdated understanding of commerce.
fairness inherent in the courts’ approach to personal jurisdiction had
included the now-discarded requirement that one must have either
153
property or be present within the state, some argue that the
154
Commerce Clause definition of fairness should likewise be updated.
This position contains two major flaws. First, the substantial nexus
requirement has never been associated strictly with fairness to the
155
litigating parties. Indeed, the substantial nexus requirement is just
one of four requirements instituted by Complete Auto to assure fair
taxation on foreign firms; requirements two, three, and four already
156
incorporate such fairness considerations.
Thus, fairness need not
157
be considered within the definition of substantial nexus.
Second,
Congress has clearly repudiated changing the definition of physical
presence as it applies to Internet retailers. The Internet Tax
Freedom Act specifically prohibits states from asserting a nexus claim
“solely as a result of (I) the display of a remote seller’s information of
content on the out-of-State computer server” or “(II) the processing

152. See generally id. at 627-28 (theorizing that the Court could not have predicted
the growth of non-physical, Internet-based transactions as a component of interstate
commerce when it decided Quill in 1992); MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM
AT RISK, supra note 85, at 9-13 (attributing a greater reduction in state and local
revenues versus the national economy during the post- September 11, 2001 period
partly to a shift in the avenues of consumer transactions); Eric A. Ess, Comment,
Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?: States Seek Solution to Stop E-Commerce
Sale Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 893, 917 (2006) (citing John E. Sununu, The
Taxation of Internet Commerce, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325, 334 (2002)) (likening the
updating of taxation laws to conform to technology to the transformation of other
laws, such as wiretapping statutes, which were updated to accommodate changes in
communications technology).
153. See supra text accompanying note 34 (explaining the holding of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 96 U.S. 714 (1878)).
154. See, e.g., Baez, supra note 75, at 607-08 (interpreting the court’s Commerce
Clause analysis in Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. 1996) as
centered on the fairness of taxing the defendant); see also Ashraf, supra note 137, at
627-28 (discussing the suggested use of a modified, or virtual, physical nexus
requirement).
155. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (explaining that
fairness to the litigating parties is a concern more aptly included in a Due Process
determination, not a Commerce Clause analysis, which is primarily concerned with
balancing state and federal interests); Tax Comm’r of W.Va. v. MBNA Am. Bank, No.
04-AA-157, 2006 WL 3455005 (W. Va. 2006) (agreeing that the purpose of Quill was
to provide businesses with a clear guideline: businesses without a physical presence
in a state had no substantial nexus with the state).
156. See supra note 56 (describing the four prongs of the Complete Auto test). In
particular, note that prong two specifically asks whether a tax “is fairly apportioned.”
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
157. See Baez, supra note 75, at 608 (lamenting that even though fairness should
only come into play in a Due Process Clause analysis, federal courts continue to
erroneously consider fairness in their Commerce Clause analysis).
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of orders through [an] out-of-State computer server.”
Clearly,
through this language, Congress has exercised its power over
interstate commerce to prevent states from expanding the definition
of physical sales. Given the Court’s concession that Congress should
159
be granted the ultimate authority to apply the Commerce Clause,
the chances of a federal court expanding the definition of physical
sales to Internet sales are remote.
Third, the states may succeed in applying the substantial nexus
requirements to Internet sales through congressional definitions or
action. Given current legislation, however, it appears unlikely that a
court would find a substantial nexus for an Internet-based foreign
160
merchant, barring some new congressional action.
The Court is
not interpreting a blank slate; Congress has demonstrated an interest
161
in the issue of states levying Internet sales taxes. Congress has also
demonstrated an interest in the issue of states levying income taxes
162
on businesses engaged in interstate commerce.
In two directly
related laws concerning state taxation authority, Congress has acted
163
to limit state power. In fact, Congress has instituted fifty-seven laws
that attempt to preempt traditional state powers, showing that
164
Congress is generally hostile to the accumulation of state power.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax
Freedom Act § 1104(2)(B)(ii)(II)).
159. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (“Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and
to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to
collect use taxes.”) (emphasis added).
160. See Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax
Collection From Remote Vendors, supra note 50, at 1-2 (opening statement of Rep. Chris
Cannon, Chairman) (warning that “[t]he [STP] marks a significant departure from
the [state] sales and use tax system now in place in the United States” and noting
that Congress will “first address . . . the concepts contained in the [STP] before
considering legislative action”).
161. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax
Freedom Act §§ 1100-1104) (prohibiting certain state taxes on Internet access
services).
162. See Interstate Income Tax Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391 (2000) (limiting the
states’ ability to levy income taxes resulting from the sales derived by individuals or
businesses without a physical presence in the taxing state, but who ship orders to that
state).
163. See id. § 381(a) (decreeing, in a bill passed in 1959, that “[n]o State, or
political subdivision thereof, shall have the power to impose . . . a net income tax on
the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce” if the
person or business earning the income has no physical presence within the state); 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)(Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax Freedom Act,
§§ 1101-1104) (prohibiting states from levying taxes on Internet access services,
collecting Internet-only taxes, such as taxes on emails or bandwidth, and instituting
multiple taxation of e-commerce).
164. See MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, CONGRESSIONAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 1 (June 2006), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20060606095331-23055.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (deeming usurping state authority to be necessary, even
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Thus, given that Congress has never authorized the states to
implement a tax scheme that broadly affects interstate commerce in
the manner employed by the STP, states should not be able to assert
a substantial nexus over foreign Internet retailers without new
165
congressional authorization.
3. A failure to comply with the Complete Auto substantial nexus test
violates the Commerce Clause
Thus, while the Court no longer automatically applies a strict
166
dormant Commerce Clause approach to state taxation cases, it may
nonetheless find the STP unconstitutional. Both recent case law and
congressional action show that a reasonable interpretation of Complete
Auto’s first requirement—that a foreign merchant maintain a
substantial nexus with the taxing state—does not include Internet
167
transactions. The above review of the representational nexus, strict
physical nexus, and congressionally authorized theories of what may
constitute a substantial nexus reveals that none appears to satisfy the
168
substantial nexus requirement for the STP.
Note that the four prongs of the Complete Auto test are four separate
requirements imposed on state taxes in interstate commerce; they are
169
not factors to be weighed by the judiciary.
Indeed, lower courts
though such preemption was intrusive and “[l]iterally hundreds of state laws . . .
would be overridden”); see also MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, FEDERALISM AT RISK,
supra note 85, at 28-29 (outlining the ten major characteristics of the intentional
accumulation of federal power, at the expense of the states, that has occurred since
the 1960s).
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992)
(quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981) (White,
J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from
intolerable or even undesirable burdens.”).
166. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
historical and present approaches to the dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause).
167. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (Historical and Statutory Notes, Internet Tax
Freedom Act § 1101(a)) (explicitly prohibiting taxes on Internet access and
electronic commerce, barring certain exceptions).
168. See Ashraf, supra note 137, at 628-29 (concluding that until Congress passes
legislation that expressly allows state to employ use taxes on electronic interstate
commerce, Internet sales taxes cannot meet the substantial nexus requirement).
169. See Barclays Bank, Plc v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994)
(“Absent congressional approval, however, a state tax on [interstate] commerce will
not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax
(1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not
fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly
related to the services provided by the State”) (citation omitted); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (decreeing that state taxation was
valid when the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the state”) (emphasis
added).
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have invalidated state taxes that they deem to violate just one of the
170
Thus, a state argument that the Court
four Complete Auto prongs.
should weigh the contention that the STP actually improves the
prospects for fair apportionment of taxes (the second prong of
Complete Auto), or lessens discrimination against interstate commerce
(the third prong) are not relevant. Once a court finds that a foreign
merchant lacks a substantial nexus with the taxing state (a first prong
violation), as demonstrated above for the STP, then a court must find
the tax in violation of the Commerce Clause. Therefore, the MTC
cannot force foreign merchants using the Internet to comply with the
STP.
C. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project Is Contrary to the Federalist Structure of
the Constitution
For these reasons, it is entirely plausible that courts would embrace
a foreign merchant’s challenge of the STP under the Commerce
Clause, asserting that the states lack a substantial nexus over a
merchant without physical assets within some or all of the states
enforcing the STP. If that argument fails, however, the foreign
merchant could also resort to a structural argument under the
171
Commerce Clause.
Thus far, challenges to the power of state
172
taxation have been leveled against individual states. For more than
a decade, these individual state efforts to collect use taxes from
foreign merchants were required by courts to comply with the Quill
173
standards.
The STP laws, however, are significantly different from
170. See, e.g., Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743-46 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that an Ohio tax, whose satisfaction of only the second prong of the
Complete Auto test was in dispute, violated the Commerce Clause); Barringer v.
Griffes, 1 F.3d 1331, 1335-39 (2d Cir. 1993) (declaring a Vermont tax
unconstitutional and refusing to examine the third prong of Complete Auto where the
parties agreed that the first and fourth prongs of Complete Auto were satisfied, and the
court found that the tax violated the second prong of Complete Auto).
171. See Fagan, supra note 90, at 466 (citing Jason L. Riley, Keep the Tax Man Off
Line, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1999, at A14) (claiming that the states’ efforts to tax online
sales of foreign merchants “has pitted the states against the federal government”).
172. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (dismissing a firm’s
challenge of Ohio’s policy of exempting in-state, regulated natural gas vendors from
sales tax when it ruled that the state’s regulation did not violate the Commerce
Clause); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 199-200 (1995) (finding
an Oklahoma tax on bus tickets for interstate travel consistent with the Commerce
Clause); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (determining that a
state, such as North Dakota, could only force merchants to collect use taxes when the
firm willingly established a relationship with citizens of that specific state); Nat’l
Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (ruling that Illinois could
not force an out-of-state mail order company that engaged in no local advertising to
collect use taxes and remit them to the state).
173. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla.
1996) (answering the district court’s inquiry by confirming that it was appropriate
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the state laws examined in recent cases because these new STP laws
174
represent collective state action. Thus, the Quill standards may no
longer be the courts’ most pressing concern when assessing the STP.
Instead, this collective state action broadly affects not only
interstate commerce, but also the balance of federal and state power.
Courts should find the STP unconstitutional not only because it may
fail to comport with the Commerce Clause by violating the Quill
standards, as discussed above, but also because the STP is contrary to
the design of the Constitution. In particular, the STP’s foundation of
175
broad state power, articulated in the Tenth Amendment,
is
subservient to Congress’s narrow and explicit power to dictate the
176
laws affecting interstate commerce.
The ubiquity of these state laws—forty-four states have passed laws
177
under the STP —presents a majoritarian concern: if the people
truly desired these laws, then their congressional representatives
178
would pass them. On the contrary, a resolution supporting the STP
has been introduced in Congress (after the STP was supposedly in
179
effect), but has not left committee. Indeed, in 2003, the House of
Representatives held a hearing to consider the validity of the STP,

and accurate to read Quill as standing for the proposition that any activity by a
business in a state other than strict mail order sales satisfies the substantial nexus
requirement); Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 665 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ill. 1996)
(citing Quill as “[t]he most significant recent Supreme Court opinion” discussing the
requirement that a business must maintain a substantial nexus with a state to be
subjected to its taxation laws).
174. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (highlighting the collective
nature of the state action under the STP and the joint formation of the STP’s rules);
see also supra note 160 (showing that the new legal strategy of states under the STP
has been flagged and discussed by Congress).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. X (proclaiming that any “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States”).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3 (declaring that “Congress shall have power
to . . . regulate commerce . . . among the several states”).
177. See Press Release, The Streamlined Sales Tax Project, supra note 91
(advocating the states’ interests in creating a tax system that, according to the local
governments, simplifies tax procedures and reduces burdens on state business
communities).
178. But cf. League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2595, 2614-16 (2006)
(cautioning that if the criteria of Thornburg v. Gringles, 468 U.S. 30, 78-79 (1986),
are met, then a congressional districting plan might be unconstitutional with respect
to minority voting rights). More importantly, note that implicit in the League of Latin
Am. Citizens decision is the premise that, as a general matter, it is entirely
constitutional for congressional districts to be gerrymandered by the state, and thus,
Congress may not represent the true will of the people. Then again, if it is the state
legislature that has the power to influence political success for federal legislators, it is
actually more puzzling why Congress has not endorsed the STP.
179. S. 152 CONG. REC. S14191 (Dec. 20, 2005).
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180

although it did not endorse it.
One could certainly construe this
181
lack of action as tacit refusal by Congress to endorse the STP.
Just as the Court has analyzed the structure of the Constitution to
limit federal executive power, it likely would examine the federalist
roots of the Constitution to limit state power. The Supreme Court
has found that the nation’s executive, which has broad constitutional
182
authority, is most constricted when it acts pursuant to a power that
has been specifically granted to Congress, and Congress has not
183
delegated that power to the President. Analogously, a state’s broad
authority to govern should likewise be narrowly construed in arenas
184
in which specific authority is constitutionally delegated to Congress.
While this argument embraces the Court’s tendency to maintain a
separation of powers among the three branches of the federal
government, the same underlying principle holds for the separation
185
between state and federal power.
Just as the powers of the

180. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement: States’ Efforts to Facilitate Sales Tax
Collection From Remote Vendors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 148 (2003).
181. But see New Economy Tax Fairness Act, S. 664, 107th Cong. (2001)
(proposing, essentially, to endorse the Quill decision, and explicitly stating that a
state citizen’s mere use of Internet technologies to buy goods from foreign firms
does not create a substantial nexus with a state, thereby repudiating the STP).
However, like the resolution in support of the STP, this bill has not passed. See supra
note 179 and accompanying text (noting the stalled resolution in support of the
STP).
182. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581-82 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981), for the proposition that
courts need not scrutinize cases in which the executive has been granted power
through broadly worded constitutional or legislative language); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(characterizing executive power granted to the president by the Constitution as
“comprehensive and undefined”).
183. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800-01 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part) (finding that the President did not have broad authority in the
field of military justice because Congress had consistently passed rules regulating the
subject); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (“When the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb.”).
184. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (establishing the supremacy of the federal
government regarding powers that are specifically delegated to the United States, but
reserving other unnamed powers to the several States); supra notes 182-183
(describing the limitations of the President’s powers, particularly in areas where
Congress has expressly exercised its own power).
185. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 255 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005)
(advocating an “interior structure of the [federal] government, as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other
in their proper places”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 280 (James Madison) (J.R.
Pole ed., 2005) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents
and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different
purposes.”) (emphasis added).
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186

President are broadly painted, the powers of the states are broadly
articulated in the Constitution, which states that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
187
it to the States, are reserved to the States.” Neither presidential nor
state powers can include authority that the Constitution explicitly
188
Just as the Court must guard against the
delegates to Congress.
unauthorized concentration of power in the hands of the executive,
an explicit assurance of congressional authority should also be a
protection against the tyranny of concentrated power of the state
189
governments.
In this case, the Constitution clearly delegates the power to
190
regulate interstate commerce to Congress, not to the states. While
it is safe to say that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the
191
power to regulate all aspects of citizens’ interaction in this nation,
the Supreme Court has certainly allowed Congress to regulate all
192
manner of business transactions that cross state lines. The STP, by
193
its nature, goes against the spirit of the principles of federalism, as
186. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating that “[t]he executive power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America,” though not explicitly defining
executive power); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (characterizing executive power under the Constitution as
“comprehensive and undefined”).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 253 (James Madison)
(J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (proclaiming that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined,” while the powers
“which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite”).
188. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (listing in
explicit detail the powers that the Constitution grants the President, Congress, and
the States, and reiterating that these powers are separate unless otherwise lawfully
delegated).
189. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (noting that the nation’s Framers
were wary of the power of state legislators, and thus reserved power for a federal
legislative check by specifying congressional authority). But cf. THE FEDERALIST NO.
45, at 252 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (assuring the public that “[t]he
State governments will have the advantage of the federal government, whether we
compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other . . .
[or in respect] to the powers respectively vested in them”).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3.
191. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (maintaining that
Congress may only assert its commerce clause authority over matters that involve
interstate “economic activity”).
192. See id. (noting the constitutionality of congressional regulation of mining,
restaurants, and credit-related transactions because these activities are economic in
nature).
193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 254 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“If
the new Constitution [is] examined . . . it will be found that the change which it
proposes [from the Articles of Confederation] consists much less in the addition of
new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its original powers. The
regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which
few oppose.”) (emphasis added). Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander
Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (assuring citizens that “the State Governments would
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194

well as the spirit of the Commerce Clause, as the states attempt to
assert a power that has been granted to Congress, but never explicitly
delegated to the states.
That the STP muddies constitutionally delegated lines of authority
should certainly outweigh the practical clarifications that the STP
admittedly provides. The consolidation of state taxation procedures
under the STP does delineate a clear method for states to extract
revenues from interstate sales while avoiding the risk of double
195
taxation, a goal that the Court has embraced.
Indeed, state
advocates may argue that since the STP merely requests foreign
merchants to implement one simple software program to facilitate
taxation, the STP complies with the Court’s preference for
“pragmatism” over “formalism” when assessing interstate
196
transactions. Yet the STP’s fulfillment of the second of four prongs
outlined in Complete Auto is insufficient to overcome the STP’s
deficiencies. First, as previously discussed, the satisfaction of one of
Complete Auto’s four criteria cannot come at the expense of any of the
197
other three.
Second, the Court does not regard constitutional
delineations of power as merely formal boundaries that it may ignore
for the sake of simpler transactions. In fact, the Court’s preference
for simplicity over formalism extends only as far as the wording of tax
198
statutes, certainly not to constitutional principles.
Quite to the
contrary, the Court approaches issues delineating constitutional roles
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not
by [ratification of the Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United States”), with
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . regulate
commerce . . . among the several states.”), and U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states”) (emphasis added).
194. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (“The very purpose
of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.”)
(emphasis added).
195. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989) (stating that the primary
purpose of Complete Auto’s second prong of fair apportionment “is to ensure that
each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction”); W. Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 257 (1938) (praising state taxes levied on interstate
sales where gross receipts are apportioned because “it is a practical way of laying
upon the commerce its share of the local tax burden without subjecting [the
transaction] to multiple taxation”).
196. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) (citing
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)) (illustrating that the
Court is less interested in parsing specific language of specific tax statutes and far
more concerned over the practical effects the tax may have on merchants).
197. See supra Part III.B.3 (emphasizing that the four prongs of Complete Auto are
not factors, but are each independently required by the Court to comply with the
Commerce Clause).
198. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279 (contending that when considering state tax
statutes under the Commerce Clause, courts should examine “not the formal
language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect”) (emphasis added).
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studiously, with frequent reference to The Federalist as a guide.
One therefore cannot ignore the argument that the STP appears to
be not only incongruent with the plain language of the Constitution,
but also contrary to the principles outlined in The Federalist. Thus,
barring congressional action, courts should also reject the STP as
contrary to the federalist design of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
While the MTC clearly attempted to frame the STP in a manner
acceptable under current constitutional jurisprudence, in order to
allow the states to recover perceived “lost” revenue by coordinating
with one another, there are at least two lines of reasoning available to
declare the STP unconstitutional. While the goals of the STP seem
entirely reasonable, the STP operates in a legal gray area, where, in
the absence of congressional approval, state regulation of interstate
commerce might be constitutional, but has hardly been endorsed by
Congress. Shrewdly, the MTC included a risk-reward program within
the STP, offering merchants the opportunity to comply with the
regulations on a voluntary basis. Thus, the MTC might avoid a legal
challenge of the STP, should merchants find compliance cheaper
than protest.
Any online merchant without a true physical presence in a state
200
can challenge the STP, as applied by that state.
First, the foreign
merchant can challenge a state’s claim that, under a current
understanding of the Commerce Clause, the merchant maintains a
substantial nexus with the state. A merchant could dispel all three
expansive notions of a substantial nexus by pointing to contrary
congressional intent, in conjunction with current jurisprudence.
199. See Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1324, 1329-30 (1998) (analyzing the frequency of citations to The Federalist in
Court opinions and finding that opinions in the 1980s and 1990s cited this authority
much more frequently than those in prior eras); James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred
Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of the Federalist Papers, 1985 BYU L. REV. 65, 68-73 (1985)
(asserting that the increased citation to The Federalist by the Court has coincided
with the rise of the assertion that understanding historical context is more important
than interpreting the plain language of disputed law or clause).
200. By design, this Comment assumes that the foreign merchant would have
standing to bring this suit. Many challenges to the STP would also satisfy the
ripeness requirement, since merchants must begin to implement the STP
immediately, or risk legal action by the states. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S.
296, 300 (1998) (stating that a claim cannot be ripe if it depends upon future,
uncertain events before the dispute materializes). It is entirely possible that a
challenge to the STP might arise when a state prosecutes a foreign merchant
pursuant to the STP. Given the amount of money in controversy here, it would be
surprising if no state or merchant entered into a legal dispute over the
constitutionality of the STP within the next several years.

EVANS.OFFTOPRINTER

454

1/9/2007 1:12:23 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:2

Second, the merchant can also claim that the STP should be struck
down on the structural basis of the Constitution. Under the STP, the
states have collectively acted without the approval of Congress, and
with Congress’ tacit disapproval, pursuant to the Commerce Clause—
an arena designated for congressional governance.
Thus, despite the careful planning of the MTC, courts should find
the STP unconstitutional.

